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REVIEW
Volume 63 1997 Number 3
THE SEVENTH ABRAHAM L.
POMERANTZ LECTURE
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CORPORATE-SECURITIES
LAWYERING: BELIEFS, BIASES AND
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR"
Donald C. Langevoortt
In this lecture, I want to draw connections from
underutilized literature on organizational behavior to the
domain of corporate lawyering, especially on matters of
disclosure and legal compliance. Theory and research on
predictable biases in managerial judgment have much to say to
us about the problems that lawyers face when counselling
organizational clients. Drawing from these materials, my
primary goal is to add something new to the literature on
lawyers' professional responsibility and the often-discussed (if
dimly understood) virtues of lawyerly independence.
* ©1997 Donald C. Langevoort. All Rights Reserved.
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for their thoughtful responses. Hal Levinson, Mark Sargent, Jim Cheek Don
Welch and Richard Painter also provided helpful comments as I was preparing the
lecture.
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We tend to think of the problem of independence as the
one that faces the corporate lawyer when the client's
management is bent on fraud or some other form of legal or
moral wrongdoing. My argument here is that the hazards are
more subtle and banal, that some of what passes for deliberate
fraud and failure to supeivise is often more a question of
managerial misperception-in good faith, perhaps, but
potentially just as harmful to the client corporation and its
external constituencies.1 If such bias is a robust phenomenon,
then not only are there important implications for corporate-
securities law, but the common understanding of the
challenges associated with good corporate-securities lawyering
needs to change.
I. COGNITION AND INDEPENDENCE
There are two spheres of knowledge that lawyers must
bridge when giving legal advice. One is knowledge of the law:
an amalgam of information and insight drawn from prece-
dents, other forms of authority and practical experience. The
other is knowledge of the facts: a broad understanding of the
situation in which the client finds itself. Volumes have been
written about the former kind of knowledge, the process of
legal reasoning. In contrast, my interest here is in the latter
form of epistemology and its relationship to professional re-
sponsibility. I speak here not in the disciplinary sense, but in
the aspirational terms of what it means to be a "good" business
lawyer.2 Lawyers are often told, with commonplace attribution
' In making this claim, I do not want to ignore the likelihood that some of
what passes for fraud is neither corruption nor misperception, but rather action or
inaction that is blameworthy only because it is viewed in hindsight-in other
words, a product of the bias of the subsequent observer. See MARK BOVENS &
PAUL T'HART, UNDERSTANDING POLICY FIASCOES 8-9 (1996); see infra notes 92-95
and accompanying text.
2 That is the focus of most of the literature on professionalism, which recog-
nizes that bar disciplinary efforts play a secondary role in controlling the behavior
of business lawyers except in extreme circumstances. See William H. Simon, Ethi.
cal Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988); David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). Indeed, emphasis
on rules may detract from what is really important. See Heidi Li Feldman, Codes
and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
885 (1996); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303 (1995). The knowledge question is insightfully explored
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to Louis Brandeis,3 that they cannot offer sound advice unless
they thoroughly understand their client as well as the problem
it wants to solve. But apart from some clinical "interviewing
and counselling" literature, most of which relates to (often
unsophisticated) people as clients, the question of what it
means to know the client and the situation remains largely
unexplored.4
The knowledge problem is especially challenging in my
special field of interest, securities law. Lawyers are frequently
asked to create documents, filings or press releases that por-
tray the company's business, managerial and financial situa-
tion. The client, of course, is a fictional entity, embodied in a
large and diffuse collection of people and information. The
disclosure will be used by investors whose aim is to predict the
issuer's future financial performance. There must be attention
to material risks and adverse trends: factors that may affect
the business, but which fall far short of certainty, thereby
requiring complex and subjective probability assessments.5
with respect to the rules of professional responsibility in William Hodes, The Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Kutak Rules and the Trial Lawyer's Code. Sur-
prisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAWI L. REV. 739, 802-10 (1981).
' See PHIjPPA STRUm, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 38-41
(1984).
' There is beginning to emerge a behavioral literature on lawyers' judgment.
See, e.g., Paul Brest The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as
Counsellors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEmp. PROBs. 5 & nn.2-3 (1996);
Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy and the Law in Lawyers' Heads,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1498 (1996); Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering
Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313
(1995). There is also a body of writing (largely non-behavioral) on the factual
knowledge of the lawyer as it relates to questions of professional liability, with the
common recognition that lawyers can sometimes hide behind lack of kmowledge for
protection. See, e.g., Hodes, supra note 2; John P. Freeman & Nathan M. Crystal,
Scienter in Professional Liability Cases, 42 S.C. L. REv. 783 (1991). I have ex-
plored this latter question with reference to the literature on social cognition. See
Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?].
' The standard test for assessing the materiality of uncertain information is
the probability/magnitude test, which requires a balancing of the likelihood of the
event coming to pass against the magnitude of impact on the issuer should it do
so. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Obviously, required disclosure
is often highly formalized, with line-item requirements divorced from any assess-
ment of materiality. Still, materiality and risk disclosure is at the heart of disclo-
sure regulation, especially with respect to potential liability for fraud or nondis-
closure. For a good sense of the practical challenges in this area, see Dale E.
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At the risk of venturing into postmodern rhetoric, it should
be plain that discovering the "truth" about an issuer-espe-
cially when the truth is reflected in a mosaic of probabilistic
and forward-looking data-is an exercise in social construc-
tionism.6 There are always multiple meanings that can be
drawn from all the little bits of data that go into the total mix
of materiality. The process of arriving at a single meaning can-
not be divorced from the collective perceptions and interests of
the people engaged in the process; and in business organiza-
tions, those people are large in number and far from single-
minded. The aggregation and assessment of information from
diffuse sources is an extraordinarily difficult task for a lawyer.
Yet law schools and law firms largely assume that securities
lawyers will confront this interpretive task intuitively, or
through training and experience drawn from others who,
though considered experts, have not developed a systematic
theory of what they do either.' To be sure, many lawyers do
their job well, exercising what Donald Sch6n describes as the
practitioner's reflective wisdom. What is missing is both a
candid acknowledgement of the epistemological difficulty of
corporate-securities practice and a rigorous effort to study it in
context to aid the profession as a whole.
My aim here is to begin to fill that gap by exploring the
process of coming to know the organizational client, especially
as it relates to giving advice on disclosure-related questions.
By necessity, this first requires an understanding of how busi-
nesses understand themselves and their environment, drawing
heavily on work in managerial behavior about corporate belief
systems. In turn, the epistemological question relates to what
is the most focal topic in the lawyers' professionalism debate
these days, the role of "independence." Our profession works
from the assumption that lawyers are to maintain some inde-
Barnes, Jr. & Constance E. Bagley, Great Expectations: Risk Management Through
Risk Disclosure, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 155 (1994).
6 PETER L. BERGER & THOIAiS LUCKMANN, THE SOcIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY (1966).
' For a rare and insightful inquiry into the nature of corporate counselling,
see JAMES C. FREUND, ADVISE AND INvENT: THE LAWYER AS COUNSELOR-STRATE-
GIST AND OTHER ESSAYS (1990).
8 See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS
THMNK IN ACTION (1983).
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pendence from their clients, both in order to offer more objec-
tive advice and, at least arguably, because of competing public
responsibilities? As debates have made clear over the last
quarter century within both corporate and securities law (Na-
tional Student Marketing being an early trigger point"0 ) and
the profession at large (e.g., the Kutak Commission's whistle-
blowing recommendations in the early 1980s"1), there are still
strong differences of opinion about how much independence is
appropriate, and what the proper posture of independence is,
especially when the client is an entity.' Anthony Kronman's
recently-celebrated image of the "lawyer-statesman," s which
canonizes the virtues of detachment and independence, has
been attacked both by those who think that it pays too little
attention to the need for loyalty and zealous advocacy" and
' The classic article on this subject is Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of
Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988). See also Robert L. Nelson & Peter Trubek,
Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/AwYERS' PRACTICES 177 (Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
10 SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); see
also The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, 11973-1974 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCID 79,631 (January 1974) (speech by then-SEC
Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr.); Joseph C. Daley & Roberta S. Karmel, Attorneys'
Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMTORY LJ. 747 (1975);
Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest and
Professional Ethics, 76 MIC. L. REV. 423 (1978). This was followed by other cele-
brated cases, most notably In re Carter & Johnson, (1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,847 (1981) and In re OPM Leasing Services, Inc., 32
Bankr. L. Rep. 199 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). Most recently, of course, the involve-
ment of lawyers in the savings and loan scandals has generated extensive debate
about the lawyer's proper role.
" The original recommendations of the American Bar Associations Kutak Com-
mission was to impose a whistle-blowing obligation on lawyers faced with client
fraud, a proposal ultimately rejected by the ABA. E.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Rectifi-
cation of Client Fraud. Death and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 EMORY LJ.
271 (1984); Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talhed About Ethics:
A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OMO ST. L.J. 243 (1985).
' The Model Rules, like other professional conduct standards, make clear that
a corporate lawyer represents the entity, not any of its constituents as such. E.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1994). Nonetheless, the board
of directors ultimately speaks for the client, at least absent an obvious conflict of
interest, and the lawyer may not in any event violate client confidentiality by
going public with information about disloyalty. Obviously, this puts lawyers in
difficult positions when transactions tempt managers to act disloyally. E.g.,
Roberta S. Karmel, Duty to the Target Is the Attorney's Duty to the Target a Par-
adigm for Directors?, 39 HASINGS L.J. 677 (1988).
13 ANTONY T. KRONmAN, THE LosT LAVrYiE FAILING IDEAIS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 11 (1993).
1 See James K. Altman, Modern Litigators and Lawyer-Statesmen, 103 YALE
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those who argue that it posits an inherently reactionary role of
preserving existing hierarchies of power and privilege dominat-
ed by lawyerly self-interest."
I do not want to try to resolve this tension so much as
consider it along another dimension. Different strategies of
both proximity to and detachment from the client have differ-
ing consequences for the possibility of coming to an under-
standing of what passes for objective truth about the client and
the situation. These postures constitute the range of possibili-
ties for what I refer to as the "cognitive independence" of the
corporate lawyer. I am postmodern enough not to stake out the
position that there is some single objective reality to "the cor-
poration" and its prospects. But at some point-and in hind-
sight-investors, competitors, judges, juries, administrative
agencies and other significant audiences may well construct
one, and the good lawyer earns her living anticipating that
exercise.
A reasonably high level of detachment is assumed, of
course, in the process securities lawyers call due diligence. As
the courts have described it in Securities Act cases, 6 due dili-
gence involves an attitude of skepticism and devil's advocacy,
ferreting out facts from underlying documentation and other
sources without undue reliance on any one person or group.
But due diligence is expensive and fairly atypical in corporate
representation; and even when called for, there is still a
L.J. 1031 (1994) (reviewing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)).
"' See David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for Practicing Lawyers: Separating
Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1994)(reviewing AN-
THONY T.KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1993)). Brandeis is often viewed as the archetypal lawyer-statesman, but even he
has come under criticism along similar lines. See Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advo-
cate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996).
1" Section 11 of the 1933 Act gives persons associated with a public offering
who would otherwise be liable for misrepresentations or omissions in a registration
statement a defense if after reasonable investigation they had no reason to believe
that the statement was false or misleading. That is known as the due diligence
defense. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Feit
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
17 Notwithstanding occasional curiosities like FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969
F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), it is generally assumed that in most transactional set-
tings, the lawyer is under no duty to investigate its client to assure the accuracy
of information provided by management. See ROBERT J. HAFT, LIABILITY OF AT1oR-
NEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS § 5.05 (1995-96 ed.).
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good bit of pragmatic judgment associated with choosing which
of many possible avenues should be explored to gain an accu-
rate picture of the company's business condition. In sum, reli-
ance on people within the organization as the primary, some-
times sole, source of information is the norm in corporate prac-
tice, especially with respect to questions like product and mar-
ket risk factors. Again working mainly from intuition and
experience, most lawyers-especially at the outset of represen-
tation-decide who can be trusted as reasonably objective, and
piggy-back on their thoughts and perceptions.
Throughout the process of representation, some lawyers
will seek to blend both professionally and socially into the
culture of the significant organizational insiders, valuing prox-
imity as a way of truly understanding the client and its envi-
ron-ment and (not coincidentally) bonding with the client's
management personnel in a way that will generate continued
or additional business." Others will be more distant, follow-
ing the Brandeisian insight that detachment produces better
quality advice, not to mention a greater degree of personal and
professional autonomy. I suspect that in today's highly compet-
itive and fluid market for elite legal services, the "quick bond-
ing" approach of the former is an increasingly common strate-
gy.
My aim in the Parts II and I is to describe the risks and
benefits associated with the various postures of cognitive inde-
pendence. Although these have broad implications for the prac-
tice of corporate law generally, most of my case studies will be
drawn from the process of risk assessment for purposes of full
disclosure. The analysis will deliberately be more descriptive
than normative. I am reasonably convinced that many lawyers
do a poor job of subjective risk analysis, and that this relates,
in part at least, to judgmental biases associated with deriva-
tive information-gathering and compromised independence."l
1" On the competitive pressures on client relationships in business lawyering,
see, for example, Ronald J. Gilson, The Deuolution of the Legal Profession: A De-
mand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990); KRONUAN, supra note 13, at
283-91.
' In his influential work, Robert Nelson has shown that corporate lawyers'
ideologies and attitudes come to conform to their clients. See ROBERT L. NELSON,
PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF LARGE LAW FIRMS
(1988). My emphasis here on factual inference is different, but not unrelated.
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In this sense, my claim will support those who have called for
renewed emphasis on lawyerly independence in corporate prac-
tice.20 At the same time, however, I admit the costs and bur-
dens associated with detachment, and so point in the end to
something of a compromise. For reasons that are interesting in
and of themselves, this middle ground will not be easy to stake
claim to, making it all the more important that we discuss the
issue openly and carefully. Part IV will then turn to ways in
which certain substantive legal issues of concern to corporate-
securities lawyers may be influenced by the insights we have
developed.
II. THE RISK OF PROXIMITY: COGNITIVE BIAS AND CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE
Lawyers learn about their entity clients and their situa-
tions in many ways. Some of it is documentary: reading files,
letters and accounting reports. But putting aside the formal
exercise of due diligence, most learning comes from talking to
people associated with and usually employed by the company.
Those people have the first-hand knowledge of the business
and problems that require legal assistance, and hence the
lawyer's "schema"-the term psychologists use to describe
mental roadmaps that people use to make sense of a situa-
tion2 -- is initially driven by theirs'. During interviews and
more informal (even gossipy") conversations, savvy lawyers
will try to figure out who seems reliable and trustworthy, and
0 See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD.
L. REV. 255 (1990); Harold M. Williams, Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, 36
BUS. LAW. 159 (1980); Zacharias, supra note 2. Richard Painter has called for a
notion of lawyer-client interdependence, a posture that recognizes the moral re-
sponsibility for proactive behavior that comes from the indispensable role the law-
yer plays within the organization. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence
of Corporate Lawyers and their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507 (1994). I agree
with his view- my emphasis on cognitive independence is simply a way of de-
scribing the need to avoid infection by the biases of the client. Painter's focus is
on the need for such a lawyer to engage the organizational client vigorously.
21 See SuSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 98 (1984).
Long suspect, gossip has increasingly come to be treated by social scientists
as a mechanism for learning about the thought processes of others and opening
lines of communication with them, something that becomes quite functional in a
business setting. See JAMES G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 432-35
(1988).
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weigh their accounts accordingly. The schema will evolve and
become more elaborate as the lawyer has more and more con-
tact with people and information. But its largely derivative
nature will persist.
In pursuing the concept of cognitive independence, I recog-
nize that there is a vast array of postures that lawyers assume
vis-a-vis the client in the course of information-gathering.
Some of this is a matter of choice, some of circumstance. A
lawyer called into to advise a new client on a discrete, short-
term matter rarely has the opportunity to come to know the
client well-one or two interviews (sometimes over the phone),
perhaps a lunch or dinner, will have to suffice. But continuous
disclosure questions under the federal securities laws and
comparable high-level legal judgments are usually answered by
lawyers with a close, on-going relationship with the company.
For purposes of discussing the risk of proximity, therefore, I
simply want to posit a relationship in which the lawyer suc-
cessfully "blends into" the clients' management group culture.
This is most likely the case with respect to some in-house
counsel, or outside counsel that has built a long-term work-
ing relationship with an important client, where key lawyers
in the firm spend a significant amount of their time on that
client's business and interacting both socially and professional-
ly with the client's managers. To be sure, no blending is ever
absolute. As we shall pursue later on, lawyers do have a self-
interest that is subtly at odds with their clients', and compet-
ing claims to their time and attention. I am sure, however,
that there are commonplace situations where the lawyer does
blend in to the corporate culture for all practical purposes.
If so, we can assume that the lawyers' perceptions of the
client and its circumstances will be influenced heavily by the
prevailing corporate belief system. That is not to say that the
lawyer will always think like everyone else: disagreements
' It is important not to overgeneralize about in-house counsel, for the nature
of the relationship between in-house lawyers and company managers varies great-
ly. See Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989); Ted Schneyer, Professional-
ism and Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 449
(1988). No doubt there are many in-house counsel--especially in large, highly bu-
reaucratized companies-whose independence exceeds that of outside counsel who
have close social and business ties to senior management.
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within groups are natural and often testy. Still, as discussed
below, group bonding processes create centripetal pressures
toward shared perceptions and -explanations.' Remember
that what the lawyer knows about the clients' business will
usually be highly derivative: the lawyer who has blended well
into the group may accept those perceptions and explanations
fairly willingly. He is committed to the client, and wants to be
a team player. Psychologists have shown that commitment
heavily influences attitudes;' we are also motivated to like
and believe those upon whom our success depends."
This, then, describes a lawyer who is cognitively depen-
dent on the client. And it follows that assessing the risks asso-
ciated with cognitive dependence is first a matter of identifying
the biases commonly associated with management groups as
they interpret the risks and realities of their business. In other
words, .we must temporarily shift our focus away from the
lawyer as such, and turn to corporate inference generally.
A. Managerial Inference, Client Bias
Most litigation involving corporate concealment or misrep-
resentation in the secondary markets-i.e., when the issuer is
not buying or selling its own stock and thus has nothing direct-
ly to gain from deceit-involve situations where information is
available to the company that indicates that finances are dete-
riorating, a particular product or strategy is failing, or that
some key executive is acting improperly, yet the company's
disclosure fails to take candid account of it. Some of the text-
book cases of securities fraud in recent years-i.e., the litiga-
tion against Apple Computer regarding certain of its early
2 See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psycholog-
ical Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer 1985). In their study of decision-making by corpo-
rate directors regarding the termination of derivative suits, Cox and Munsinger
offer a thorough explanation for the various social, cultural and psychological forc-
es that cause persons who are part of a functioning group to adopt consistent and
self-serving explanations and perceptions.
21 See CHARLES A. KIESLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COmmMENT (1971); ELLIOT
ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (7th ed. 1995).
26 Steven L. Neuberg & Susan T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on Impression
Formation: Outcome Dependency, Accuracy-Driven Attention, and Individuating Pro-
cesses, 53 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 431 (1987).
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1980s product failures' and Time-Warner's alleged conceal-
ment of its shift away from its plans for a strategic alliance
with international partners as the solution to its debt prob-
lem-come to mind immediately.
I am sure that some of the time, these kinds of deceptions
(assuming they did occur) are indeed deliberate, whether in
management's self-interest or in order to preserve some corpo-
rate confidentiality." But I want to pursue here the profes-
sional responsibility implications of an alternative possibility;
that cognitive biases lead managers to unrealistic causal expla-
nations for events and an underestimation of risk." These
biases can be sharpened in institutional settings, becoming
part of the company's belief system. In turn, the disclo-
sure-which at least sometimes will affect the market for the
stocksi--is skewed by relatively sincere but unrealistic be-
liefs."2 To perceptive lawyers who have worked closely with
business people, their presence will not be too surprising.
One well recognized phenomenon, for instance, is the pro-
cess of cognitive simplification. Psychologists emphasize that
human beings (and organizations) must simplify their thought
See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989).
See In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
the Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 69L The Arlen-
Carney thesis focuses only on intentional frauds, assuming for purposes of analysis
that the scienter requirement limits liability to cases of deliberate misrepresenta-
tion.
' For a much fuller discussion of the motivational issue, particularly from a
psychological and sociological standpoint, see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislcad Stock Market Investors
(and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997) [hereinafter,
Langevoort, Organized Illusions]. The emphasis here on cognitive bias should not
be taken as the sole plausible alternative explanation. Mly other article explores a
host of others, including the need for competitive secrecy and the problems of
multiple audiences and distortions in information flow.
"1 The question of whether the disclosure affects the stock price is closely
bound up in the efficient market hypothesis. See infra text accompanying notes 78-
81.
' For a review, see Dennis A. Gioia, Symbols, Scripts and Sensemahing: Creat-
ing Meaning in the Organizational Experience, in THE THINKING ORGANIZATION:
DYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL COGNITION 49 (Henry P. Sims & Dennis A.
Gioia eds., 1986). For a relatively rare legal invocation of this sort of problem, see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Wo Soul to Damn, No Body to Rich • An Unscandalized In.
quiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 ICH. L REV. 386, 391-92
(1981).
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processes in order to manage daily affairs. There is too much
to think about otherwise. And one way we do this is to develop
stock explanations for what is happening. Once established,
these "schemas" are naturally resistant to revision: to rethink
our assumptions constantly results in cognitive paralysis."
This tendency to resist evidence of change is enhanced in
group settings, where there is a well-recognized "groupthink"
tendency not to introduce the stress that comes from challeng-
ing established common understandings.' One of the more
fascinating articles published in recent years on business eth-
ics-repaying careful study by all business lawyers-is a dis-
cussion of how Ford's product recall personnel missed danger
signs associated with that vehicle's on-road performance pre-
cisely because of a well-established normalcy schema in a very
noisy informational environment.35
Another such phenomenon is optimism. Put simply, there
is much reason to believe that corporate cultures that subcon-
sciously promote a pervasively optimistic frame of view are the
most adaptive, leading to harder work and more long-term
commitment by employees and other stakeholders36 (and
dampening through self-deception the awareness of danger
that might otherwise trigger a cascade of selfishness). In a
"can do" kind of organizational culture, there will be a natural
tendency to deflect or rationalize emerging evidence of prob-
See Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproull, Managerial Response to Changing Environ.
ments: Perspectives on Problem Sensing from Social Cognition, 27 ADMIN. SC. Q.
548 (1982); Daniel A. Levinthal & James G. March, The Myopia of Learning, 14
STRATEGIC MGMiT. J. 95 (Spec. Issue, Winter 1993).
34 See IRVING JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUpTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS (1972).
"s Interestingly, this study was done by a well known organizational psycholo-
gist who before his professional training was a recall manager for Ford at the
time of the problems. See Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics. A
Script Analysis of Missed Opportunities, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 379 (1992).
" See James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and
Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. Sci. 1404 (1987); MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTI-
MISM 100-12 (1991). The Seligman book is interesting for its discussion of the
deliberate plan of Met Life to hire people for the sales force who have a natural
optimistic bias; something perhaps troubling given the company's later legal diffi-
culties with its sales practices. I have explored the effects of ego on law-related
behavior in Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior and Law, 81 VA. L. REV.
853 (1995) [hereinafter Langevoort, Ego]. Related to optimism is a darker possibili-
ty: that managerial perceptions are simply self-serving. See Langevoort, Organized
Illusions, supra note 30, at 143-46.
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lems or risks, leading to the obvious potential for distorted
disclosure. Faced with some evidence that a product under
development is failing, or an erosion of market share, man-
agers in many companies will honestly but mistakenly believe
that these are minor challenges that can readily be overcome.
They will draw on inflated schemas of past successes, and
underrate their competitors ability to capitalizeY
It is hardly difficult to find securities law cases that fit
with this set of explanations. Once again, the "product-hype"
cases like Apple and Polaroid may well be examples of man-
agement groups underestimating the danger signals associated
with failing products, convinced in their ability to make them
work and intolerant of any official acknowledgment of likely
failure. We can also speculate about others. One of the best-
known enforcement proceedings by the SEC in recent years
has been the one against Caterpillar Inc.' for failing to dis-
close the "known trend or uncertainty" of an erosion of prof-
itability from its Brazilian subsidiary, which had contributed a
disproportionate percentage of the company's profitability the
previous year. Evidence showed that the company's senior
management was aware of the underlying facts, so that this
was not a case of ignored information. Why didn't the
company's Management Discussion and Analysis, which re-
quires disclosure of "known trends and uncertainties," include
the risk of a reversal of fortunes in Brazil? Political sensitivity
may have been one reason. But another could well have been
management's biased expectation that overall company perfor-
mance (of which the Brazilian operations were but a small
part) would be managed in such a way that, indeed, the previ-
ous years disproportionality would not be misleading."3
' For some useful studies of corporate decision-making along these lines, see
Edward J. Zajac & Max H. Bazerman, Blind Spots for Industry and Competitor
Analysis: Implications for Interfirm (1is)perceptions for Strategic Decisions, 16
ACAD. MGmT. REV. 37 (1991); Mathew Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explain-
ing the Premiums Paid for.Large Acquisitions: Euidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN.
SCL Q. 103 (1997).
' See In re Caterpillar Inc., EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE No. 30532, March 31,
1992.
' The managed performance possibility, among others, is noted in Edmund W.
Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763,
810-12 (1995).
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A third well-recognized trait has to do with commitment.
Once people have made some voluntary commitment to a per-
son or course of behavior, there is a strong subconscious need
to maintain consistency in the face of subsequent events, to
justify the commitment to themselves and others. This under-
lies the well-known concept of cognitive dissonance. Thus,
managers who make an investment are motivated to focus on
the project's upside potential more than its downside risks, to
bolster the wisdom of the choice.4 The most dramatic form
this takes in business settings is the escalation of commitment.
A bank official who makes a bad loan may well foolishly make
an additional loan to the borrower to try to cause a turn-
around, motivated largely by the inability to admit a mistake
in the first place-a reason that some banks carefully separate
their work-out teams from the original lenders.
Once again, this insight can help explain the motivation
underlying the alleged concealment of information in the prod-
uct-hype cases. Institutions will resist acknowledging to them-
selves and others that they made a mistake. Preliminary prob-
lems are trivialized by reference to external causes that have
been brought under control.4' I am also convinced that this is
a powerful explanation for the tendency of many managers to
deny that a person in the organization-perhaps some key
player-is incompetent or dishonest, even as the evidence
mounts. I have written elsewhere about the likelihood that
lawyers may not be good monitors of their clients' behavior;
40 The classic exposition here is Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment
to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 577 (1981). Although there may be
multiple explanations for the phenomenon, it is interesting to note how often in
the case law on tender offer defenses and management buy-outs, directors commit
early to a course of action (e.g., a merger with a particular partner) and refuse to
alter their course, even though such rigidity risks violating a duty to the
company's shareholders. E.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
41 See Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Behavior in Escalation Situations: Ante-
cedents, Prototypes and Solutions, in 9 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 39 (L.
L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1987).
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having committed to the representation, they are motivated to
see the client's activities as legitimate and thus ignore red
flags.' The infamous OPM fraud case may well be an exam-
ple of this."
So, too, will a board of directors resist coming to grips with
indications that a valued chief executive officer is acting cor-
ruptly. Here I find a potentially useful insight into the recent
Section 21(a) report claiming that the board of directors of Coo-
per Companies Inc. violated their disclosure obligations in
their unqualified support of their CEO, Gary Singer, notwith-
standing evidence produced by an on-going SEC investigation
that Singer had misused company assets and information for
personal benefit and Singer's refusal to cooperate with an
internal special counsel inquiry." One can well imagine that
the board was strongly motivated to trivialize or rationalize
the evidence, and accept Singer's likely claims that the prob-
lems were the product of some bad judgments that will not be
repeated, that his contributions to the success of the company
far outweigh the costs of the indiscretions, and that the SEC
investigation had turned into a bureaucratic witch-hunt. I
suspect that these biases were also at work in some of the
recent "rogue trader" cases,5 where investment firms and oth-
er institutions failed to detect or take action in response to
dangerous trading activity by key employees. Fast-rising talent
at banks and investment firms, people like Paul Mozer"6 and
John Jett,47 were dedicated, personable and hard-working-
See Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note 4, at 101-05.
See Langevoort, Where Were the La wyers?, supra note 4, at 106-08.
" Report of the Investigation in the Matter of Cooper Cos. Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 35082, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH) J 85,472
(Dec. 12, 1994).
' For contrasting discussions of the problem of policing rogue trader activity,
compare Jerry W. Markham, Guarding the Kraal-On the Trail of the Rogue Trad-
er, 21 J. CORP. L. 131 (1995) (optimistic about monitoring, though recognizing
difficulties), with Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk- Some Lessons
for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Custom-
ers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996) (more pessimistic, though recognizing that some
useful steps are necessary and appropriate).
"On the Mozer matter, see Michael Siconolfi & Laurie P. Cohen, The Trea.
sury Auction Scandal at Salomon-Sullied Solly: How Salomon's Hubris and a
U.S. Trap Led to Leaders' Downfall, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1991, at AL
I7 See Alix M. Freedman & Laurie P. Cohen, Jett's Passage: How a Kidder
Trader Stumbled Upward Before Scandal Struck, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1994, at
Al; these issues are considered further in Part IV.B infra.
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not to mention profitable. The senior managers who hired,
promoted and rewarded them had ample motivation to deflect
subconsciously any dissonant information and give them the
benefit of any doubt. It is hardly surprising that abuses per-
sisted longer than they should have.
The three motivational forces described above hardly oper-
ate separately. In most organizations, it is their confluence
that can produce the most severe distortions of reality in the
corporate belief system. A company that faces some external
risky shift in its environment wants to avoid the stress of ac-
knowledging the threat-with the accompanying
destabilization of group cohesion should change be needed-
especially if the external threat calls into question the commit-
ments made by the organization as a whole or its senior man-
agement. And it may well trivialize the most salient of the red
flags by drawing on collective and individual myths of power
and control. 8 Much of the literature on episodes of organiza-
tional failure in the 1980s and 90s invokes some combination
of these accounts in telling their stories. Companies that have
successfully weathered such crises are often those that resisted
the biases and accepted the reality of the imminent risk of
loss, often engaging in wholesale dismissals of senior execu-
tives in order to facilitate the necessary cognitive readjust-
ment. No doubt the public disclosures by companies in crisis
reflected the way they dealt with the threats internally, unless
their lawyers intervened both carefully and vigorously.
Of course, the behavioral accounts here gradually merge
into ones that fit the'more orthodox economic story as well:
management buying time through more deliberate concealment
and deception in an effort to take one last shot at saving their
jobs. But that may come relatively late in the process, after the
managers have underestimated the problem and committed
themselves to a course of action (or inaction) that they are
highly motivated to rationalize both to themselves and exter-
nal constituencies. Once realization finally does set in, they are
48 The tendency to draw on outdated schemas in times of stress is emphasized
in Paul C. Nystrom & William H. Starbuck, To Avoid Organizational Crises, Un.
learn,12 ORG. DYNAMICS, 53, 57-58 (1984). No doubt the difficulty in spotting the
potential for crisis is that many such crises appear quickly. Even though external
support may be softening, that is rarely expressed openly. Only when there is
some triggering event does support vanish quickly.
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already in very deep. In other words, the last period problem
may be a serious concern, but it is probably more delayed in its
onset and shorter in its duration-and thus all the more in-
tense when it does emerge-than the standard rational-actor
account would suggest.
From the foregoing, we can predict that the cognitive chal-
lenges to the lawyer will vary depending on the age and cir-
cumstances of the company in question. Younger firms have
less well developed internal cultures, and hence less rigid be-
lief systems.49 Those beliefs are more likely to be dominated
by the personalities of the company's founders. With fewer
cognitive commitments, there is greater flexibility. No doubt
the greatest threat to accurate disclosure for young companies
comes from overoptimism.' These firms have grown quickly,
overcoming the obstacles that face all start-ups through some
combination of skill and luck. They often rely heavily on the
cohesiveness and enthusiasm of a small group of executives,
often dominated by a single charismatic founder, with an ex-
traordinarily high sense of skill and ability that is untempered
by time and experience. These managers will place great
weight on hiring new managers with similar traits and trans-
mitting their "can do" optimism throughout the firm, resisting
the enthusiasm-draining acknowledgement of uncontrollable
risk. This is probably part of the story underlying many of the
high tech fraud allegations that, meritorious or not, are the
subject of so many securities class actions.
In contrast, aging firms are frequently more rigid. Here,
leadership by top management may often be more an illusion
rather than a reality.5 Their response to external risks are
more likely to be affected by the pressure to preserve existing
norms and commitments. Indeed, in many cases--once exter-
nal threats are finally acknowledged-the first response of top
management is to increase the centralization of control and
decision-making authority, which has the unintended and dan-
" See W. Richard Scott, The Adolescence of Institutional Theory, 32 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 493 (1987).
" See Leslie E. Palich & D. Ray Bagley, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain
Entrepreneurial Risk Taking, 10 J. Bus. VENTURING 425, 433 (1995).
51 See James R. Mleindl, On Leadership: An Alternative to the Conventional
Wisdom, in 12 RES. IN ORGAMZATIONAL BEHAV. 159 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M.
Staw, eds., 1990).
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gerous effect of reducing the flow of useful information to the
top.5" Lower level managers abet this by distancing them-
selves from crucial decisions, lest they be tainted completely by
the ensuing failure. This further narrows the focus and range
of options considered by the top managers, leaving them to
draw excessively on their own (and now misleading) past expe-
riences, thereby making decline all the more likely. Moreover,
if the initial response is too conservative, that commitment by
itself will bias the managers subsequent perceptions, making it
hard to reverse the effects of the judgmental error. One is
reminded, for example, of Pan Am's decision to sell off more
and more of its most profitable nonairline assets as its primary
strategy for preserving the core institution, when external
circumstances suggested that it was the core institution that
needed to be rethought in light of airline deregulation. 3 One
of the best-known securities fraud cases of the early 1970s, the
set of lawsuits by stockholders and commercial paper investors
of the Penn Central railroad, also fits this pattern.'
2 See Robert I. Sutton, Organizational Decline Processes: A Social Psychological
Perspective, in 12 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 205, 223-26 (L. L. Cummings &
Barry M. Staw eds., 1990); Barry M. Staw et al., Threat-rigidity Effects in Organi.
zational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis, 26 AD iN. Sci. Q. 501, 508-511 (1981).
Not all companies act in such a way, of course. For an exploration of the possible
precursors, see William Ocasio, The Enactment of Economic Adversity: A Reconcili.
ation of Theories of Failure-Induced Change and Threat Rigidity, in 17 RES. ORGA-
NIZATIONAL BEHAV. 287 (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1995). Though it
would help lawyers greatly, there is no model that predicts ex ante the extent to
which one organization is more subject to bias than another.
' See Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 350,
369 (J. Keith Murnighan, ed. 1993).
" For an interesting academic study of Penn Central's decline, which attributes
it more to bad judgment than misfeasance (as was later alleged in SEC and Con-
gressional investigations), see STEVEN SALISBURY, NO WAY TO RUN A RAILROAD:
THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE PENN CENTRAL CRISIS (1982). A natural question in
light of this is whether debacles such as Penn Central shouldn't lead companies to
learn to be more rational and flexible, i.e., whether there is not likely to be an
evolutionary migration toward the rational firm. The various responses-e.g., the
difficulties of learning, the "on average" adaptive qualities of optimism, and the
contingent and changing nature of challenges arising within the corporate environ-
ment-are considered in Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 30, at 148-56.
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B. The Lawyer's Place
Once we acknowledge the possibility of corporate bias, we
can plainly see a vexing challenge to the corporate lawyer who
must guide her organizational client through the process of
disclosure: she must worry about contagious bias. That lawyer
mdy find herself cognitively overdependent on the client for
factual inferences, and thus unable to exercise the kind of
objective legal judgment necessary to arrive at sound disclo-
sure decisions. She can become so much a part of the client
"team" that she shares all the motivations and attitudes that
affect the management group.
This is especially the case if the lawyer has actually been
involved in a decision or assisted a course of action, so that
she, too, is motivated by commitment to bolster the choice. The
well-connected lawyer assumes in-group status, and the vari-
ous in-group biases follow. There are strong temptations push-
ing the lawyer in this direction. Team players are highly val-
ued, and can expect continued business from the client. As
negotiators and advocates (in contrast to the purely advisory
function), internalizing the company's belief system probably
results in greater loyalty and zealousness-highly adaptive
traits for an ambitious lawyer or firm. Here, the optimism and
sense of control that can enhance managerial performance bol-
sters the lawyer's performance as well, albeit with the same
kinds of risks that are the unavoidable by-product of too much
comfort and confidence. And, frankly, many lawyers want to be
"in-group" for reasons of personality, status and sociability.
Nor is it likely that this loyalty and zealousness will be
any more a cynical act of dramaturgy for lawyers than it is for
managers.' Cognitive dissonance theory suggests the strong
need to maintain consistency between adaptive attitudes and
beliefs and the lawyer's commitment to the representation. The
commitment dominates, and the beliefs and attitudes migrate
toward conformity. Anxiety is diminished and effectiveness
enhanced if the lawyer believes what the client believes rather
than carrying the baggage of nagging, distracting doubts.' In
" This is not to say that lawyers do not posture for their clients. See John
Flood, Doing Business: The Management of Uncertainty in Lauyers' Worh, 25 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 41, 44-45 (1991).
As noted earlier, highly focused belief that one is both right and in control
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sum, there are ample conformity pressures that incline the
lawyer toward the internal, self-deceptive acceptance of the
organization's positive belief system that defines cognitive
dependence."
III. COGNITIVE INDEPENDENCE AND THE DILEMMA OF DISTANCE
Now that we have defined and explored the risks of mana-
gerial bias and cognitive dependence, the notion of cognitive
independence follows naturally. A securities lawyer is
cognitively independent when he has effected sufficient separa-
tion from the inferential biases of the corporation's belief sys-
tem so that it is possible to exercise good judgment relating to
materiality and the duty to disclose. Such independence, of
course, is important to all corporate lawyers in their counsel-
ling function, far beyond disclosure matters."
Cognitive independence is not a question of status or phys-
ical proximity, but of state of mind. It involves a sophisticated
understanding of the risks of bias, and a recognition that judg-
ments of the accuracy of the perceptions of individual manag-
ers cannot be made simply by estimating whether they are
good, trustworthy people. Lawyers probably overestimate the
extent to which they can make such credibility judgments
of the situation leads to more aggressive, persistent and influential behavior. See
supra note 36. In organizational settings, moreover, there is evidence that believ-
ing that the employer is "right" reduces internal moral conflict and thus leads to
greater personal effort and efficacy. See Barry Z. Posner & Warren H. Schmidt,
Value Congruence and Differences Between the Interplay of Personal and Organiza-
tional Value Systems, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 341 (1993).
', A similar argument regarding the dangers facing accountants and auditors
can be found in Max A. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Indepen-
dence, 38 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 89 (Summer 1997). There is also a simpler source of
dependency. Putting aside all the motivational influences, we must remember that
lawyers are not auditors, and generally have to rely on managerial sources of
information and insight, especially with respect to subjective matters like business
risk. There is an inevitable social learning component to the fact-gathering task. A
lawyer who is too trusting of the accuracy and completeness of what one or more
managers says about a matter runs the risk of being tainted by their biases even
if the lawyer has not achieved in-group status.
" In the abstract, at least, the value of detachment in rendering advice is
beyond question. Clients want sound advice, not simply comforting or reinforcing
advice. E.g., KRONMAN, supra note 13, at 66-74; Mark A. Sargent, What Does It
Take: Hallmarks of a Business Lawyer, 5 BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug., 1996, at 11,
13 n.6.
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anyway,59 but honesty is never the whole question. Fortifrate
corporate lawyers will have as clients companies with thought-
ful managers who do see things realistically and without bias.
Although biases may be pervasive, distortion that has a mate-
rial effect on corporate disclosure is the exception, not the rule.
But the skilled corporate lawyer must be sensitive to the fre-
quency with which good people (and good organizations) distort
reality, the circumstances that exacerbate such tendencies, and
the unconscious pressure that she faces to follow those infer-
ences. She should be prepared to question managerial percep-
tions in light of these predictable biases and try to reorient the
disclosure.
I could end this lecture here. Cognitive independence is
essential to good corporate-securities counselling. Our
profession's habitual incantations of the virtue of detachment
notwithstanding, it deserves more thorough and deliberate
recognition by the bar. Such independence is an acquired skill
that depends on understanding both human and organizational
nature: it can and should explicitly be studied, taught and
learned in the same way that corporate managers are being
taught in business schools and executive seminars to try to
debias their own thinking and learn the proper times to shift
to a different "script. Just as importantly, law firms must
attend to their own cultures: they should not, through their
own emphasis on profitability, business generation, and client
service, generate a "customer is always right" bias if they are
to do their jobs well. If I have succeeded in persuading the
reader of this, I have accomplished a good bit.
On this overestimation of the ability to judge character, see Peter J.
DePaulo et al., Lying and Detecting Lies in the Organization, in IMPRESSION MAN-
AGEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION 377 (Robert Giacalone & Paul Rozenfeld eds.,
1989). Even judges do not do particularly well in tests. See Paul Ekman &
Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AL. PSYCHOL 913 (1991).
See Meryl R. Louis & Robert L Sutton, Switching Cognitive Gears: From
Habits of Mind to Active Thinking, 44 HUL. REL. 55 (1991). The debiaing litera-
ture emphasizes that although avoidance of excessive reliance on cognitive
heuristics is important, learning to do so is much more easily said than done. See
Baruch Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Daniel Kahnemn
et al eds., 1982). On some techniques for training, see Max Bazerman, supra note
37, ch. 10.
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A. The Difficulties and Burdens of Distance
Unfortunately, there is far more to the problem, causing
me to see the question of cognitive independence in terms of
both necessity and dilemma, and thus I want to extend the dis-
cussion further. We have already established one reason that
cognitive independence is difficult to achieve. Usually, the
lawyer is motivated to believe what the client's management
group believes, and the tendency to conform will occur subcon-
sciously. The egocentric attributions that can distort managers'
self-evaluations can also taint lawyers."s A lawyer may well
consciously embrace the need for independence: proclaiming its
virtue to others, convinced that she lives out the professional
ideal of sympathetic detachment. But in practice, her percep-
tion may still be distorted in order to reduce the stress of dis-
sonance.62 Probably far more lawyers pride themselves on in-
dependence and good judgment than consistently exhibit it. It
becomes easy to see cognitive dependence as other lawyers'
problem.
Such hubris is not easy to overcome. People rarely learn
well from their own mistakes of judgment because they either
fail to acknowledge them or externalize much of the blame.'
Learning from the mistakes of colleagues, assuming that these
mistakes are publicized at all, is difficult as well. It is probably
better to intervene early, allowing young lawyers to glimpse
situations where honest, decent lawyers (hypothetical or real)
fell prey to distorted judgment, and let them recognize both the
breadth and depth of the difficulty, hopefully generating a
61 See Langevoort, Ego, supra note 36, at 860-65; for empirical studies of self-
serving inference by lawyers, see George Lowenstein et al., Self-Serving Assess-
ments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargain, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); Theodore
Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorneys Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 979 (1994); Loftus & Wagenaar, Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28
JuRiETRICS J. 437 (1988).
62 Indeed, albeit at the risk of overanalyzing, it is worth noting the tendency of
human beings to deal with unconscious guilt-inducing forces to become obsessed
with the matter as exhibited in others (transference). Lawyers whose independence
is compromised may be the ones given to the most public insistence on the need
for professional independence and a ready ability to spot problems in the indepen-
dence of others. Their own compromises remain a blind spot.
' See the discussion of the self-esteem bolstering use of excuses in C.R.
SNYDER ET AL., EXCUSES: MASQUERADES IN SEARCH OF GRACE 55-58 (Raymond L.
Higgins & Rita J. Stucky eds., 1983).
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"There but for the grace of God..." response. This debiasing is
a job for legal scholars, law schools and bar associations. Law
firms might use senior lawyers not involved with a particular
client as independent sounding boards on fact perception,
though this is probably of limited utility given the contextually
complex nature of such judgments.
Suppose, however, that a lawyer acknowledges the pres-
sure toward dependence and the resulting need for careful self-
monitoring. A strong message of the previous section is of the
need for some skepticism of managements optimistic assess-
ment or dismissal of risk. But there are also costs associated
with too much questioning. First, it is distracting. If material-
ly-significant cognitive distortions are the exception rather
than the rule, as suggested earlier, then questions and de-
mands for independent assessment by a lawyer who is a step
removed from the business situation both in terms of familiari-
ty and expertise will introduce an unnecessary burden most of
the time. This burden comes both in the form of time and ex-
pense in responding to the lawyer, as well as the introduction
of doubt and stress-the very things that these biases are
adaptively designed to avoid. In some sense, the "realistic"
lawyer may debilitate the group by threatening its solidarity
and optimism.
There is also an informational risk to the quality of legal
advice associated-with too visible a posture of detachment and
skepticism. Management teams no doubt test their lawyers for
loyalty, and may well use the lawyer's willingness to conform
to their perceptions as a proxy. The lawyer who repeatedly
expresses doubt hardly endears herself to the clients manag-
ers; failure to show loyalty to the group, and the group's be-
liefs, is likely to result in exclusion from the inner circle and
hence loss of access to key information and insight. She be-
comes part of the out-group rather than the in-group, 4 and
information blockage may well follow-assuming that the rep-
resentation is even allowed to continue.
For a classic study of the 'plasticity" needed to become accepted in manage-
rial circles, see ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL IAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MAN-
AGERS ch. 3 (1988). On the varying responses in corporate settings to identical
criticism whether from in-group or out-group members, see IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRArmWAn'E, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 105 (1992).
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B. The Uneasy Techniques of Mediation
Being a cognitively independent lawyer is difficult and
stressful enough internally. But ultimately, the client's man-
agement is in control of both the underlying facts and the
output of corporate disclosure, and the lawyer's professional
responsibility offers her little leverage over the management
group.65 When factual assessments are subjective and hence
multiple good faith interpretations possible, the lawyer is not
barred from rendering assistance." Usually, the lawyer will
only suspect, not know, that the managers are being unrealis-
tic. In the end, then, the good lawyer-the one who does not
simply suffer a failure of will when faced with the chal-
lenge67-- must effectively negotiate with the managers for
both undistorted access to information and influence over the
disclosure process. She must also do so in a way, as noted
above, that does not jeopardize her in-group status or result in
diminished access to information.
"' Under the prevailing rules of professional responsibility in most jurisdictions
-and acquiesced in by the SEC-the lawyer confronted with client fraud may not
publicly blow the whistle. Resignation or internal efforts to rectify are the only op-
tions, and although some resignations can be accomplished "noisily," see Ronald
Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional Con.
duct: Blowing the Whistle and Raising the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455 (1984);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992), the
lawyer's bargaining position is limited. The demise of private aiding and abetting
liability under the federal securities laws, see Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), further dampens the attorney's incentive to
resist. Note, however, that recent reforms in the American Law Institute's Law
Governing Lawyers would increase the attorneys' obligations and discretion in
these settings.
"6 Withdrawal or noninvolvement is required as a matter of professional re-
sponsibility only when the lawyer knows that the client's course of action is un-
lawful or fraudulent. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.2(d)
(1997). Where management is acting in good faith, albeit subject to possible bias,
there are rarely sufficient grounds for "knowing" that they are wrong.
'7 Richard Painter's construct of moral interdependence is relevant here. His
concern, which he illustrates with reference to the SEC's Rule 2(e) proceeding
against two lawyers who gradually tried to distance themselves from their client's
fraud (In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 82,847
(Admin. Proc. 1981)), is that lawyers sometimes too easily seek to distance them-
selves from managements illicit preferences-perhaps deceiving themselves about
their nature and consequences of their inactivity. Such distancing deprives the
entity of an important source of protection and can actually send the unintended
message to those managers that what they are doing, though not proper, is not
sufficiently serious to provoke a stronger adverse reaction from the lawyer.
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If legal requirements are clear enough, this will not be
difficult. But most forms of risk disclosure are subjective and
probabilistic, and here, the difficulty is plain. When a lawyer
challenges managements overly optimistic assessment or dis-
missal of some risk, the natural reaction is rarely one of wel-
come. Because of its adaptive nature, managers will not easily
drop their optimism simply because a lawyer has a different
point of view. Just as likely, if not more, they will dismiss the
lawyer's view as inexpertly alarmist, lacking in sufficient busi-
ness experience or acumen. Like many people, their reaction to
a threatening message will, in essence, be to "shoot the mes-
senger" (i.e., deflect the message by challenging th6 credibility
or competence of the source). The right response is a persis-
tent, tactful assessment of the risk of litigation, bad publicity
and other adverse consequences from potential nondisclosure,
emphasizing the risks of hindsight. For many clients, espe-
cially those where the securities law compliance function has
become well-routinized, this will be enough. But sometimes,
management may have too much at stake in its own belief sys-
tem.
If management balks, there are two conventional, but
problematic, responses short of giving in and washing one's
hands of the consequences. One is to draft the disclosure in a
way that discloses a risk but talks about it in distant, hypo-
thetical terms. I suspect that one explanation for the preva-
lence of boilerplate disclosure is that it represents an easy
compromise between the lawyer's insistence on disclosure and
management's refusal to acknowledge, publicly or to them-
selves, that the risk is a real one that they may not be able to
control.
Boilerplate, however, is hardly the best solution, for it is
too easy for a judge or jury to disregard later on.c' The best
risk disclosure is customized and contextual. One need only
look at the recent safe-harbor for forward-looking information
in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-the
protection for disclosure that contains meaningful cautionary
' E.g., In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993) (dis-
cussing the "bespeaks caution" doctrine).
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language, and is not boilerplate69-to see the risk of compro-
mised disclosure and the benefits of candor. The independent
lawyer needs to push harder if she can.
Another conventional response is to overthreaten. If it
seems necessary, the lawyer can skew a presentation by- dra-
matically inflating the risk either a lawsuit or a judgment,
trying to instill the sharp fear that even if they are right in
trivializing or ignoring the risk, the chance of being second-
guessed wrongly is simply too great. The problem here, of
course, is that the lawyer must essentially be dishonest with
the client, albeit with the best of intentions. And that, as we
shall see in the next subsection, can become a very slippery
slope.70 I do have a suspicion that the apparent misperception
among corporate managers and boards of directors of the rela-
tively high risk of a securities class action (or SEC investiga-
tion)-statistics notwithstandingT--may be due at least in
part to the way some corporate lawyers have portrayed those
risks to them in an effort to overcome their natural reluctance
or apathy with respect to disclosure obligations.
C. The Lawyer's Own Self-Serving Bias
A third problem inherent in the notion of cognitive inde-
pendence mirrors a discussion found in the debate over
lawyers' independence generally. Once the lawyer accepts the
need to sometimes second-guess the managers' perception of
the facts and circumstances and exercise independent judg-
ment, there is an inevitable risk that this judgment will itself
9 See new § 21E(c) of the Securities Exchange Act, and H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
104-369, at 11 (1995). The SEC has expressed concern with the boilerplate quality
of many post-legislation filings that seek the protection of the safe-harbor.
70 This problem is explored in Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISc. L.J. 375 (1997).
71 There is factual evidence that calls into question whether there has been an
explosion in class action litigation at all, making it problematic to describe the
situation as a crisis. See Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV.
438 (1994). Similarly, an SEC investigation is (given the Commission's limited
resources) unlikely. No doubt there is a good bit of randomness to adverse conse-
quences flowing from biased disclosure.
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be distorted by the lawyer's own self-interest. Robert
Rasmussen and I have written about this in detail else-
where," so my discussion here will be fairly summary.
Lawyers have a strong self-interest in the advice they give.
Even conceding the importance of not cheating in the short-run
if it would jeopardize repeat business from a client relation-
ship, some advice leads to more billable hours on a project
than others. As we have just seen, questioning the client is
time-consuming. Just as important, however, is the
reputational asymmetry. A lawyer loses far more by giving the
go ahead to a course of action that is later subject to legal
sanction than she gains from advice that is not challenged. On
the other hand, there is frequently no reputational penalty
from too much caution because the client lacks the knowledge
and expertise to second-guess the lawyer's judgment. In sum
(and subject to some predictable exceptions), lawyers are moti-
vated to overstate legal risk. James Freund observes this in his
book on client counselling.73 Also apt along these lines is a
fascinating study by Edelman, Abraham and Erlanger of the
way both business lawyers and human resource specialists
have seemingly inflated the threat posed by wrongful discharge
law, with a resulting gain to them in power and resources
within client organizations.74 And just as managers can dis-
tort reality when believing that they are acting in the
corporation's best interests, so can lawyers dwell excessively on
risk while considering themselves fully loyal to their client's
interests.
This inclination will be offset when the lawyer bonds too
completely with the client's management group. Once the law-
yer internalizes the group's motivation to deflect or rationalize
risk, her interest in solidarity and whatever other needs are
met by inclusion may come to dominate the tendency to spot
Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 70; from a different angle, see Marcel
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing
Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASIL U. L.Q. 347 (1996).
' FREUND, supra note 7, at 40-50.
1' Lauren Edelman et aL, Professional Construction of Law: The Threat of
Wrongfud Discharge, 26 L. & SoCY REV. 47 (1992).
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and dwell on disclosure risks. This is especially so if the lawyer
has some means of avoiding apparent responsibility for the
final disclosure judgment calls.75
A deliberate posture of cognitive independence, on the
other hand, permits this self-interest to surface. To a limited
extent, this is probably a good thing-self-interest boosts the
lawyer's motivation to resist management's biases. However,
when the lawyer becomes too independent of the client's way of
thinking, the anchor of client interest may be displaced in
favor of one that is based too much on the lawyer's
reputational and pecuniary interests. The problem then be-
comes lawyer involvement in the disclosure process that over-
compensates for managerial bias and results in a risk of excess
disclosure and a chilling of useful impression management
techniques above what a rational cost-benefit analysis would
require. This, too, may be an explanation for the seemingly
excessive fear of litigation and enforcement that has been in-
culcated in many corporate officers and directors. As some of
the commentators on Kronman's call for lawyer-statesmen
have pointed out, independence may be a virtue that masks
the profession's ability to gain at unwitting clients' expense.7"
For all these reasons, we cannot embrace cognitive inde-
pendence without also acknowledging its subtle dangers. The
truly good corporate lawyer must seek independence, but rec-
ognize the difficult terrain of its path and the sometimes self-
ish temptations lawyers face along the way. Our profession
should at least be willing to provide a map and a compass.
IV. EXTENSIONS INTO LAW: SECURITIES LITIGATION,
COMPLIANCE SYSTEMS, AND THE LAWYER-DIRECTOR
PROBLEM
If we accept that corporate beliefs can sometimes be dis-
torted without malice or deliberate deception and that lawyers
may be subject to the their strong pull, more follows than a
lesson in professional responsibility. This section will explore
connections between the behavioral insights just generated
and three substantive legal topics that have a heavy "lawyer-
7' See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
7' See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 15, at 470-71.
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ing" component: the incidence of securities litigation, the duty
to supervise and monitor as part of corporation and securities
firm compliance programs, and the debate over the lawyer as
director of a client corporation.'
A. Securities Litigation
1. The Risk of Judgmental Error
As noted earlier, securities law orthodoxy sees the problem
of issuer disclosure as one of conventional fraud (or perhaps
negligent misrepresentation). Epistemologically, companies are
deemed to know all the relevant information that is in the
possession of insiders acting within the scope of their authori-
ty; the practical question in litigation is whether any of those
insiders were deliberately misrepresenting or concealing it or
its implications, or failed to respond to flags that would be a
dark enough shade of red to any objective observer. We have
seen now, however, that this is simplistic. What the manage-
ment group knows is bound up in its subjective construal, and
predictable biases will sometimes lead managers to fail to ap-
predate problems and risks that would be significant to some-
one on the outside, especially in times of corporate stress.
Unless company lawyers effectively counter the biases, disclo-
sure may well be false and misleading to investors as a result
-the trigger point for a class action or SEC enforcement pro-
ceeding.
Obviously, these are not the only subject areas implicated. The lessons of
cognitive bias and the struggle for objectivity come into play on a regular basis in
corporate boardrooms and executive suites-derivative suits (as explored by Cox
and Mlunsinger, supra note 24) and tender offer defenses being only some of the
more dramatic examples. We could well engage in a profitable inquiry into the
business judgment rule and self-dealing problems, where managerial self-serving
inference is likely to be commonplace but, because of the deference given to "inde-
pendent" director decision-making as a matter of law, the lawyer has less persua-
sive leverage than in disclosure settings. Here, I suspect, the tendency to sharpen
and overstate the legal risks involved is strong as the lawyer-for a variety of
reasons-seeks to exercise control over the situation.
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Fortunately, the teachings of the efficient market hypothe-
sis assure that these biases will frequently be harmless." In-
vestment analysts and other professionally informed investors
are able to discount the most predictable forms of overopti-
mism and the illusion of control. Their independent sources of
information may expose well the risks that management ig-
nored or trivialized.79 As in the Apple Computer case,"0
courts fairly consistently afford companies a "truth on the
market" defense in private litigation when they can show that
the excessive optimism or nondisclosure did not in fact mislead
market professionals. Courts are also increasingly willing to
presume that general expressions of managerial optimism are
immaterial per se.81
Salutary as market efficiency can be in many instances, it
is not a cure-all for the influence of behavioral biases on corpo-
rate disclosure. First, of course, many issuers trade in markets
that are not characterized by a high degree of professionally
informed trading. 2 Second, management remains in tight
possession of the most sensitive forward-looking information.
In the end, analysts are still influenced by subjective manage-
rial assessments of the company's prospects and risks-earn-
ings and forecasts are highly material notwithstanding
analysts' other sources of insight."s Management remains a
78 The standard legal text on the ways that markets cure individual errors is
Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549 (1984). From a legal standpoint, the primary teaching of the efficient
market hypothesis is that market prices are set by informed investors, who react
promptly to new information. Uninformed traders have no significant price impact.
On the efficient market hypothesis and forward-looking information, see Roger
Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management Projections: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 46 MD. L. REV. 1197 (1987).
"' Analysts talk regularly to competitors, suppliers and customers--as well as
to the company itself-to assess the company's future prospects. In this way, they
will often be in a position to see the same risks that management may ignore.
80 In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989).
81 E.g., Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997); Raab v. Gen-
eral Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993). Eisenstadt goes so far as to suggest
that because professional investors discount managerial optimism, the literal truth
could have a misleading market impact because it would be so unexpected.
82 On the conditions for efficiency, see Virginia Bernard et al., Challenges to
the Efficient Market Hypothesis: Limits to the Applicability of the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 73 NEB. L. REV. 781 (1994).
' Thus, company contacts with investment analysts are common and, by all
accounts, capable of affecting markets through selective disclosure. On the new
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filter through which key information flows, and the possibility
of a filtration bias cannot be eliminated even in efficient mar-
kets. Analysts will assess credibility and reputation for objec-
tivity, but such judgments are subject to substantial variability
given the turnover of key personnel and-more important-
ly-situational changes. Credibility assessments are rough
guesses, sometimes inaccurate and subject to manipulation.
They are an incomplete substitute for other forms of control.
Finally, albeit more controversially, there is an increasing body
of evidence that "noise traders" (i.e., those who are not profes-
sionally informed) can and do move stock prices significant-
ly85
If we concede that these biases can sometimes distort the
market price of a security, then interesting conceptual prob-
lems ensue for securities litigation policy. They are less press-
ing under the enforcement regime of the Securities Act of 1933,
which imposes an affirmative obligation of inquiry into the
company's prospects and financial condition for public offer-
ings. Obviously, the due diligence investigation by accountants,
information content of one form of forward-looking information, the MD&A see
Stephen H. Bryan, Incremental Information Content of Required Disclosure Con-
tained in the MD&A, 72 ACCT. REV. 285 (1997). It is worth noting, moreover, that
institutional investors are the primary claimants in most fraud class actions: their
expertise does not eliminate their ability to be deceived by company disclosure,
however privileged their access is to it. E.g., Elliott Weiss & John Beckerman, Let
the Money Do the Monitoring:. How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs
in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995). In as notorious an alleged
fraud as Penn Central, a primary "victim" was Goldman Sachs. See Salisbury,
supra note 54, at 178-80.
Though it is beyond the scope of our discussion here, the possibility of cogni-
tive bias affecting the investment decisions of professional investors is not insub-
stantial. For example, one might well expect even professional investors to have a
tendency to hold onto a stock too long, a manifestation of the commitment bias.
See Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early
and Ride Losers Too Long, 40 J. FIN. 777 (1985); DAVID DREMAN, THE NEW
CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGY (1980). Hubris is quite possible among invest-
ment professionals. E.g., David Hirshleifer et al, Security Analysis and Trading
Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information Before Others, 49 J. FIN. 1665,
1686 (1994). Professional investors may be overconfident in their ability to assess
managements credibility and competence, and reluctant to admit error to them-
selves or others.
I' E.g., Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Dam-
ages: A Legal, Economic and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7 (1995); Claim
Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for 'Dirty Pooling"
and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL J. CORP. L. 141 (1997).
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underwriters and specialized counsel-all outsiders less likely
to be blinded by management's biases-is a good, if not entire-
ly perfect, antidote. At most, the lesson here simply reinforces
the desirability of double-checking management's risk assess-
ments with key suppliers, customers and analysts.86 Perhaps
we should worry a bit more-about the loss of due diligence in
an era of shelf registration and the move toward "company
registration."87
The much more interesting questions arise under the Se-
curities Exchange Act, where private litigation (and a fair
segment of SEC enforcement) is premised on Rule 10b-5, which
in turn requires a showing that the misrepresentation or omis-
sion was made with scienter.' Rule 10b-5 is the primary con-
trol mechanism for a wide range of corporate disclosure activi-
ty, from everyday publicity to, after the Gustafson case, 89 pri-
mary capital raising activity via nonpublic offerings of securi-
ties.
At first glance, the behavioral insights suggest a signifi-
cant risk of underinclusion. If scienter means either knowing
misrepresentation or concealment or (in its recklessness vari-
ant) a conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk,"0 then
many of the distortions we have identified should fall outside
the scope of the rule.9' Cognitive bias is consistent with sin-
"' Increasingly, this is a standard practice among high quality issuer and
underwriters' counsel. See, e.g, John Seegal, Due Diligence Procedures in Initial
Public Offerings, in PRACTICING LAW INsTITUTE, How TO PREPARE AN INITIAL Pun-
LIC OFFERING 251 (B4-7043 April 19, 1993).
'7 See Sec. Act Rel. No. 7314, [1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,823 (July 25, 1996). It is at least possible, on the other hand, that mandato-
ry due diligence is of less importance for larger companies entitled to utilize these
simplified procedures given the extent to which professional analysts can more
easily (though not completely) detect fraud in such companies. See Stephen Choi,
Company Registration: Toward a Status Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 567 (1997).
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Gustafson v. Alloyd Corp., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
Increasingly, this subjective definition of recklessness, as articulated in cases
such as Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977), is the
common one. For an exploration of its indeterminacy, see Paul Milich, Securities
Fraud Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Recklessness, and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J.
CoRP. L. 179 (1986).
91 This brings us to one of the great underexplored issues under Rule 10b-5:
the meaning of scienter in a corporate environment. See Craig Griffin, Corporate
Scienter Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1989 BYU L. REV. 1227. The
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cerity; it does not demonstrate bad faith. If so, this would be a
powerful defense in litigation; the apparent problem would be
that Rule 10b-5 is not up to the task of policing biased infer-
ences. A broad defense would justifiably trouble those whose
concern is more with protecting marketplace integrity than
assessing whether the defendant had a sufficiently dark heart
(especially when the defendant is a fictional entity that, literal-
ly at least, has no heart).
But practically speaking, this possibility is probably over-
stated. One is hard pressed to find the "cognitive bias" defense
as a commonplace trial strategy. Judges and jurors are unlike-
ly to be moved by it. After all, they are viewing the case in
hindsight, when a risk that management underestimated did
indeed come to pass. Ample research in psychology demon-
strates that once people are told of an outcome, they systemati-
cally overestimate the likelihood that they could or would have
predicted that outcome in advance. In the words of the leading
researcher on the subject, Baruch Fischoff, people "not only
tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but
also to view it as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before
it happened." 2 And reminding them to ignore the subsequent
courts have done a much better job of showing what scienter is not (e.g., negli-
gence, good faith, absence of business justification) than what it is. Suppose that
there are facts readily available to company officials that indicate material risk,
but that they honestly fail to appreciate their implications. Although the state of
the law gives no basis for predicting with certainty whether the Rule is violated,
there is at the very least a significant possibility of a good faith defense to liabili-
ty. Many courts suggest that the key to scienter in fraud cases is conscious
awareness of the deceptive nature and consequences of one's actions. There is the
possibility, however, that a court could imply corporate scienter from the piecemeal
knowledge of various actors, even though none of them individually had the requi-
site scienter. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 62 F.3d 955 (7th Cir.
1995); William Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY LJ. 647
(1994). But see Thomas Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggre-
gate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210 (1997).
Cf. In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,801 (Admin. Proc. 1985) (holding company responsible even though executive
who misspoke to the press was not aware of the truth). This issue is explored
more fully in my Organized Illusions, supra note 30, at 126-30.
2 Baruch Fischoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Pastk Heuristics and
Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIMSCS AND BIASES
335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). For legal discussions of the hind-
sight bias, see Kim A. Kamin & Jeffirey J. Rachlinsk Ex Post Does Not Equal Ex
Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUmL BEHAV. 89 (1995); Hal
Arkes & Cindy Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Dif-
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information does surprisingly little good. This research sup-
ports the often-articulated fear by officers, directors and appel-
late judges of "fraud by hindsight"9 3 in securities cases. Given
that scienter can always be shown circumstantially," the po-
tential for the hindsight bias to affect the fact-finding in a
securities fraud lawsuit is severe, diluting the effectiveness of
the good fith defense. 5
For these reasons, it is questionable whether innocent
cognitive bias is much of a liability buffer. Indeed, we may
actually have the reverse problem of that suggested earlier: a
possibility of overinclusive liability if one accepts the premise
of scienter-based liability, and an additional invitation to ex-
cessive or extortionate litigation to the extent that cases can be
made to seem sufficiently appealing in hindsight to cause ear-
nest settlement negotiations. This would suggest that propo-
nents of litigation reform efforts might well have been justified
in seeking some form of relief. Precisely how much the en-
hanced pleading requirements and safe-harbor for forward-
looking information of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act blunt this tendencys---and at what cost in terms of meri-
ferences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994). Importantly for our pur-
poses, some research shows that the hindsight bias is likely to have its greatest
effect for negative events where the ex ante expectations regarding the level of
care likely to be taken by the subject in question were high. See David Schkade &
Lynda M. Kilbourne, Expectation.Outcome Consistency and Hindsight Bias De.
mands, 49 ORG. BEH. & HUL DECISION PROCESSES 105 (1991).
,' Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1978).
"E.g., Huddleston v. Herman & McLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
" The danger can be amplified by another significant psychological tendency,
the fundamental attribution bias. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 67-75.
When judging others, people are inclined to overweigh dispositional rather than
situational factors, and to explain events more in terms of the causal influence of
the actor and her personality than really is warranted. In other words, we over-
personalize events, attaching excessive credit to good outcomes and assessing too
much blame to bad ones. The temptation is strong for a jury that observes a false
statement to say that it was a deliberate or reckless lie.
90 The new pleading requirement, incorporated into new § 21D(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, forces plaintiffs to state in their complaint facts that give rise
to a strong inference of scienter. Even before the Act, courts that applied a similar
requirement made plain that unreasonable optimism is not the basis for such an
inference. For a survey of the pre-Act law, see Elliott Weiss, The New Securities
Fraud Pleading Requirements: Speed Bump or Road Blocks?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 675
(1996). Still, courts may allow complaints to survive on sufficiently persuasive sto-
ries of motive or circumstantial evidence. In any event, the new legislation does
not apply to public enforcement, raising the possibility that SEC enforcement ac-
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torious suits being dismissed--cannot be answered at this
point in time.
Obviously, if management is a biased monitor with respect
to what might later seem or be deceptive, the responsibility for
assuring the accuracy of secondary market disclosures should
be shared with some outside constituency." As the primary
external "bonder" of disclosure quality, accountants have an
obvious role to play here, 8 but it is limited to certain kinds of
risks. The possibility of outside directors (perhaps through a
special disclosure committee of the board) is also interesting,'
but outside directors are naturally hampered by limits of time
and attention and potentially severe in-group bias pull, at least
in the absence of an identifiable crisis."'s They are less likely
to be a good early warning system for risk disclosure.
So, we come back to the corporate lawyer."1 In theory,
wise companies will encourage their lawyers to challenge their
assumptions about risk and prospects, even if it is costly and
uncomfortable. But we shouldn't be too sanguine that this will
happen easily. Again, optimism is adaptive, and allowing the
tions will go forward relatively unchecked in bias cases, notwithstanding the scien-
ter requirement. For a discussion of the SEC's incentives in bringing cases, see
infra text accompanying notes 123-27.
', By responsibility I mean best available mechanism for checking bias. Wheth-
er any non-insiders should be given legal responsibility is a separate question. I
have expressed skepticism that lawyers, for example, are cost-effective gatekeepers
given their own cognitive limitations. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra
note 4, at 115-17. Clearly, imposing legal responsibility has a cost impact that
must be reckoned with.
" But see Bazerman et al, supra note 57. For expressions of both promise and
concern, see the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL
REPORTING (the Treadway Commission Report) (1987). For some use of social cog-
nition materials in the training of auditors with respect to fraud, see the various
articles in ROBERT K. ELLIOTT & JOHN J. WILLINGHAM, MANAGEVIENT FRAUD: DE-
TECTION AND DETERRENCE (Robert Y, Elliott & John J. Villingham eds., 1980).
This is part of the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on the Capi-
tal Formation and Regulatory Processes. See Sec. Act Rel. No. 7314, at 85, 286-87.
"07 On outside directors generally, see, for example, Laura Lin, The Effectiueness
of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence,
90 Nw. U. L. REv. 898 (1996); regarding their biases, see Cox & Munsinger, supra
note 24.
... One is reminded here of the remarks of Chancellor W'illiam Allen of Dela-
ware, commenting on the value of independent directors as monitors of takeover
battles. Allen's view is that the crucial difference in the outcomes of these cases
turned not so much on the directors themselves as the lawyers and other profes-
sionals retained to advise them. William T. Allen, Independent Directors In MBO
Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055 (1990).
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lawyers to introduce too great a sense of nonboilerplate pessi-
mism into the company's belief system runs the risk of damp-
ened morale and threatened relationships with noninvestor
constituencies, not to mention raising the cost of legal services.
Confident managers are unlikely to acknowledge their inability
to assess risk objectively in the first place, and hence not see
that great a need to defer to others. In sum, "fraud" arising
from cognitive bias is likely to be a sticky phenomenon with
costs to the capital marketplace that are difficult to avoid. The
good corporate-securities lawyer should simply try the best she
can to minimize them.
2. Reliance on Advice of Counsel
Whether raised formally as a defense in litigation or sim-
ply as an explanation or excuse for alleged misbehavior, man-
agers sometimes justify disclosure-related activity by saying
that counsel gave their blessing, leading them to believe that
their conduct was lawful. Courts have not been clear in securi-
ties law or elsewhere what cleansing effect reliance on counsel
has when the alleged violation requires a showing of scienter
or negligence.' While there is an intuitive appeal to the idea
that counsel's blessing means that a manager can go forward
reasonably and in good faith, it quickly runs into the
overarching concept that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Those courts that do admit the possibility of the defense take
pains to assure the independence of counsel, full disclosure of
all material facts to counsel, and the legal (as opposed to factu-
al) nature of the advice before going any further with the anal-
ysis, and the defense is often rejected on these grounds. 1 3
The matter of cognitive bias, of course, is implicated in
each of these elements. In disclosure matters, legal decisions
are often highly probabilistic and fact-specific, and depend on
judgmental inferences with respect to business prospects. Ide-
ally, we might want to expand the reliance on counsel defense
as a way of giving independent lawyers greater leverage over
"02 See Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel
as a Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1 (1976).
10 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d
933, 942 (3d Cir. 1982); Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976).
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their clients in the substance and styling of disclosure and
other legal advice. As we have seen, however, there is a sub-
stantial risk that factual inferences made by cognitively depen-
dent lawyers will be tainted by the pressures of group percep-
tions, or subtly incorporated without adequate filtration as
information is gathered from managers by the lawyers in ar-
riving at the legal decision. Thus, the literature on bias offers
some basis for the courts' relatively parsimonious use of the
defense
B. Compliance and Supervision
In recent years, corporate and securities law has given
increasing attention to the duty to supervise as a means of
preventing individual or group illegality. Section
15(b)(4)(E) °4 of the Securities Exchange Act has long provid-
ed a means for disciplining those securities firms and employ-
ees whose supervision has been lax, and the 1990s have shown
a dramatic step-up in the willingness of the SEC to impose
penalties on managers who fall short of the desired ideal, even
if they were not the wrongdoer's direct supervisor." The
quality of supervision and monitoring can become an issue in
private litigation as well under the controlling person provi-
sions of the securities laws.' The statutory reform of insider
trading enforcement in 1988 made institutional monitoring
responsibility a strict requirement for securities professionals
on the assumption that insider trading violations were often
facilitated by cultures that treated the problem as minor, if it
was viewed as a problem at all. 7 Much attention is also giv-
104 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(4)(E) (1934). Penalties for a violation run from censure
through civil penalties and suspension from the industry.
10 See Robert S. De Leon, The SEC's Deputization of Non-Line Managers and
Compliance Personnel, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 271 (1995); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan
R. Bromberg, Broker-Dealer Supervision: A Troublesome Area, 25 SE ON HALL LJ.
527 (1994). Recent interest in the problems of 'rogue brokers and traders has led
to a step-up in SEC enforcement actions regarding the duty to supervise. See
Markham, supra note 45, at 132-33. Indeed, the SEC itself has acknowledged its
decision to increase the penalties imposed in failure to supervise cases.
1 E.g., Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1934);
See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.); JALE D. COX W? AL, SECU-
RITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1029-31 (2d ed. 1997).
" Thus, Congress imposed explicit requirements that securities firms adopt
insider trading control procedures, and made all controlling persons liable if reck-
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en to the organization penalty guidelines of the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission, which instructs judges to take into account
the adequacy of a corporation's compliance structure in deter-
mining the penalty for crimes by corporate agents that can be
attributed to the corporation as a matter of law."°8 As the ex
post risk of attributed responsibility for supervisory lapses has
expanded, the ex ante design of compliance procedures has
become a growth industry for lawyers and other specialists.'
There is much to learn from organizational behavior and
other social science research about compliance systems, and a
large body of research exists that explicitly links the two."' I
do not want to explore this voluminous literature here, much
of which deals with the messy logistical problems associated
with supervising large numbers of mid- and lower-level manag-
ers and employees in major corporations. My more limited aim
in this subsection will be to relate the insights about shared
belief systems to the problem of detecting and responding to
fairly high-level instances of managerial misbehavior.
Agent misbehavior is notoriously difficult to prevent via
normal monitoring activities."' For a variety of legal, eco-
nomic, cultural and (hopefully) moral reasons, significant
wrongdoing is relatively unusual in the normal course of busi-
ness." For this reason alone, the normal day-to-day scripts
less failure to supervise led to an insider trading violation by an employee. See
Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAW. 145 (1989).
1"9 E.g., Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of
Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395 (1991).
1"' See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil
and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO.
L.J. 1559 (1990). On the securities industry, see ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER,
STREET SMARTS: LINKING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY (1997).
... See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability
of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REv. 341 (1991), and sources cited therein. For a case
study involving Revco Corporation, see DIANE VAUGHAN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
(1983).
. See Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sen-
tencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REv. 247 (1991); see
also Baysinger, supra note 110.
"1 While one would like to think that moral and cultural norms are adequate
to produce lawful behavior in most instances, many theorists argue that as much
as anything, illegality is deterred by the lack of opportunity to commit a crime
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and schemas of organizational life quite appropriately do not
prompt managers to dwell on its likelihood. Those risks are
low-level, and hence largely out of mind. Especially when su-
pervisory responsibility is given to a line manager (i.e, one
whose primary job with the company is production rather than
compliance-oriented), cognitive conservatism tends to lead to
an implicit assumption of propriety, freeing up the mind to
concentrate on more pressing tasks. As we have seen, the sa-
lient and certain tends to crowd out the ambiguous and uncer-
tain in perception and decisionmaking.
In this setting-putting aside the intervention of organized
compliance mechanisms-there tends to be reliance on rela-
tively simple heuristics to monitor misbehavior. Most people
pride themselves on being above-average judges of character,
and have confidence in their ability to spot liars and cheaters
simply by assessing their demeanor and actions." Basic be-
havioral cues, they think, should be enough to raise red flags
in those rare instances of serious wrongdoing.
This natural conservatism is bolstered by strong motiva-
tional forces. Suspicion of a fellow group member or subordi-
nate is extremely stressful, both personally and to manage-
ment group cohesion-especially when the person suspected is
valuable to the organization. The business functions more
efficiently under conditions of trust and social bonding, which
require that suspicions largely be put out of mind." More-
over, prior commitments may increase the pressure to deflect
disconfirming information about the credibility of a fellow
manager or high-level subordinate. Anyone who hired or pro-
moted that person, or previously had supervisory responsibility
over her, will find "red flag" information threatening both to
self-esteem and, potentially, status within the company be-
cause it suggests the possibility of bad judgment.
These individual tendencies can, in the aggregate, readily
be translated into powerfully conservative beliefs about organi-
zational integrity. A culture of trust is a useful, if self-serving,
myth, leading many companies to overinflate the message that
given the visibility and diffusion of responsibility of most corporate activity.
m See supra note 59.
1 In addition, inattention can also provide an anticipatory excuse in the event
of wrongdoing. See Jack Katz, Concerted Ignorance: The Social Construction of a
Cover-up, 8 URB. LIFE 295 (1979).
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in-group members can be trusted. With such institutional hu-
bris, the conditions are poor for detecting and responding to
apparent misbehavior; challenges to the prevailing assumption
will be treated as threats to organizational identity. The story
of the failure of Prudential's senior management to discover
the extent of the abuses taking place in its limited partnership
sales program may well be based on this, at least in part.1
In fact, most forms of whitecollar misbehavior are hard to
spot using common heuristics. As noted earlier, people's ability
to detect lying is only slightly above chance."6 Most forms of
"elite" wrongdoing are rationalized by the actor through refer-
ence to a common set of excuses (everyone does it, the law is
vague or foolish, the firm is pressuring me, etc.),"' reducing,
via self-deception, the sense of guilt that might produce the
expected visible cues. Rationalization is especially easy in the
financial services industry, which is changing so rapidly that
rules and norms are fluid and hence subject to multiple inter-
pretations."1 Having rationalized the misbehavior, the
wrongdoer will act normally within the prevailing culture,
reinforcing the usual schema. Many examples of such illegality
are committed by people who are not dispositionally inclined to
cheat but arise because of strong situational influences-a
sense that they are falling behind expectations in productivity
and thus might lose their job or status, for instance, or a sud-
den increased need for money."' Their prior behavior evi-
1 See In re Prudential Sec. Inc., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,238, at 84,601 (Admin. Proc., Oct. 21, 1993). For a journalistic ac-
count, see KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK (1995). The internal pres-
sures of a "trust" myth are two-fold: it will cause some to subconsciously deflect
information, while causing others-who may consciously have private doubts-from
raising them.
... See DePaulo, supra note 59, at 382.
11 See JAMES WiILIAM COLEMAN, THE CIMINAL ELITE: THE SOCIOLOGY OF
WHITE COLLAR CRIME, 206-12 (1985); W. STEVE ALBRECHT ET AL., FRAUD: BRING-
ING LIGHT TO THE DARK SIDE OF BUSINESS ch. 5 (1995).
. See Nancy Reichman, Insider Trading, in BEYOND THE LAW: CRIME IN COM-
PLEX ORGANIZATIONS 55, 56 (Michael Tonry & Albert J. Reiss, Jr. eds., 1993).
"' Relevant in this regard is the insight of behavioral decision-theory that peo-
ple alter their cognitive and behavioral patterns, becoming more inclined to take
risk, when they perceive the possibility of a loss of current status. Loss is viewed
in terms of expectations, rather than possession. See, e.g., James G. March, Vari-
able Risk Preference and Adaptive Aspirations, 9 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 5
(1988). Tournament-like settings-where winners receive a disproportionate share
of wealth can readily trigger undue levels of risk-seeking behavior. E.g., Keith C.
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denced honesty and loyalty, creating a positive schema that
further dampens any inclination to be suspicious of them now.
So far, we have said nothing that would necessarily question
the desirability of increased legal emphasis on the duty to
supervise and monitor. If organizational cultures resist even
optimal self-monitoring, especially among line managers, then
strong external incentives will be necessary to cause companies
to take compliance more seriously and introduce more powerful
monitoring mechanisms.' (A fotiori if firms do not have to
internalize the costs of the harms they do because of inade-
quate sanctions or limitations built into the enforcement or
litigation processes). The interesting behavioral insight here,
however, has to do with optimality.
No system of monitoring and supervision can ever be total.
Even putting aside the out-of-pocket costs associated with an
intrusive control system, managers need a sense of autonomy
and discretion; a feeling that everything they do is subject to
close review and scrutiny dampens morale and inhibits the
kind of risk-taking that is generally beneficial."2 This is es-
pecially true in dynamic industries like financial services.
Flexibility is a necessity, and because of the rapidly evolving
nature of the markets, supervisors often lack the expertise to
monitor sensitively. As Henry Hu and others have noted in
anticipation of the recent derivatives scandals involving Bank-
Brown et al., Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incen-
tives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85 (1996).
12 See Markham, supra note 45. One of the interesting issues, of course--given
the high level of financial and reputational impact of discovered wrongdoing-is
why firms have not previously implemented adequate control structures. The be-
havioral insights here are one answer, another possibility is that firms do not
really pay a penalty comparable to the social cost of the wrongdoing. Cf. Amar
Bhide & Howard H. Stevenson, Why Be Honest if Honesty Doesn't Pay?, HARV.
Bus. REV. Sept.-Oct. 1990 at 121, 125 (doubting that the marketplace imposes as
much of a reputational penalty as people might think).
12 See, eg., Sim B. Sitkin & Darryl Stickel, The Road to Hell The Dynamics of
Distrust in an Era of Quality, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONs: FRONIERS OF THEORY
AND RESEARCH 196 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996); Donald R.
Cressey, Management Fraud, Accounting Controls and Criminological Theory, in
MANAGEMNT FRAUD: DETECTION AND DETERRENCE 117, 125-26 (Robert K. Elliot &
John J. Willingham, eds. 1980); Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75
B.U. L. REV. 531, 540-41 (1995).
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ers Trust and others, for example, there is no easy way to
control the potential for misbehavior without chilling the very
nature of financial innovation.'s
Striking the right balance between cost and benefit, then,
is difficult. Yet when something goes wrong, even a reasonable
system of control is likely to seem defective in hindsight. I am
inclined to think that while some of the stories of supervisory
lapses with respect to rogue traders and derivatives salespeo-
ple demonstrate true culpability, others are significantly over-
stated. Regulators and journalists-both of which have strong
interests in stark characterizations of institutional wrongdo-
ing'---have little difficulty identifying suspicious events and
behaviors that seemingly should have alerted the supervisory
personnel. Often blame is placed on those, like lawyers for the
firm, who lack direct authority over the wrongdoer."l ' The
sorry implication is that only their greed, or perhaps peer pres-
sure and cowardice, silenced them." Behavioral research
suggests, however, that those supervisors probably acted in
context much the same way as most people would have under
' See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational
Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 (1993);
see also Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instruments: Lessons for the Regulatory
State, 21 J. CORP. L. 69 (1995). No doubt improved monitoring is possible, see
Markham, supra note 45, and firms will react to the current wave of problems by
stepping up the quality of these systems. But absent some strong regulatory pres-
sure, these systems will balance flexibility against control, and hence tolerate some
significant residual risk.
' Regulatory bias in terms of oversimplification and reaction to salient data is
one focus of Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1090-95 (1990). On the non-accuracy related motivations for
blaming in general, see MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAmE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL
THEORY ch. 4 (Routledge 1992); BOVENS & THART, supra note 1, at ch. 6. The
need for identifiable causal explanations may cause social actors to ignore the
difficulties in coming to accurate ex post judgments.
12 Much attention has been given to the SEC's enforcement proceeding against
various supervisors in connection with the Paul Mozer trading scandal at Salomon
Brothers. See In re Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
J 85,067, at 83,597 (Admin. Proc. Dec. 3, 1992). Here, the suspicions of illegality
were clear; the problem seemed, among others things, to lie in the diffusion of
responsibility within the firm.
' One is reminded of Clark Clifford's comment in the aftermath of his in-
volvement in the B.C.C.I. scandal: in retrospect, one is forced to see his actions as
either stupid or venal. See David E. Rosenbaum, The B.C.C.L Scandal: Charm for
Plebian and Patrician, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1992, at C5. Our discussion here
suggests that that is not the only choice.
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the same circumstances, sensing no extraordinary danger or
reason for guilt. Monitoring for unlawful behavior is far more
difficult ex ante that the regulatory stories admit. The
vagueness in the SEC's definition of supervisory authority is a
good example of this tendency,' as is its recent suggestion
in the John Jett case that a supervisor acts improperly if he
failed to investigate a subordinate's behavior simply upon
discovery of an unusually high level of profitability.'
If institutions themselves are naturally likely to underesti-
mate da~igers signs, who can best manage the risk of this kind
of regulatory reaction? Here again, I suspect that a good,
cognitively independent lawyer is the best candidate for
prompting an organization to overcome its natural hubris with
respect to compliance and move toward cost-justified systems
that, if not completely immune to overzealous regulatory sec-
ond-guessing, at least reduce its likelihood. I do not mean to
suggest, as if through rose-colored glasses, that ideal systems
can or will easily be implemented simply by an act of lawyerly
will. But I will assume that some systems are better than
others, and the good lawyer may be helpful at the margins.
Without trying either to be exhaustive or overly specific, a
number of general strategies seem essential to combat the
special problem of organizational hubris. One is the need to
make the compliance system part of a larger cultural emphasis
on ethics and integrity, with visible commitment from senior
management.' Lawyers given too much independent control
over compliance often act in a proprietary, self-serving fashion,
making rules, forms and routines the dominant feature of the
system. Moreover, as noted earlier, a key facilitator of individ-
ual wrongdoing is rationalization, seizing on an "everyone does
See De Leon, supra note 105, at 283-85.
See, e.g., In re Cerullo, 61 SEC Docket 48 (Jan. 9, 1996); Michael Siconolfi,
SEC Raises New Red Flag With Jett Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1996, at B1.
While one cannot question the idea in principle that otherwise inexplicable profits
should trigger inquiry, the costs associated with such a rule should be self-evident.
Moreover, the psychological research gives ample reason to suspect that supervi-
sors will rarely find profitability "otherwise inexplicable."
' See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. Bus.
REV. March-April 1994, at 106. For an excellent set of articles on using research
on behavioral decision-making in structuring corporate ethics and compliance pro-
grams, see CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS
(David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
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it" perception or the sense that the firm tacitly encourages
stepping over the line by setting and enforcing its performance
goals so aggressively. Companies cannot establish a general
culture and belief system that emphasizes aggressiveness, risk-
taking and limit-testing for general competitive purposes with-
out running the risk that those same attitudes will be invoked,
and subconsciously twisted in self-serving fashion, to justify
unlawful behavior.'29 Needless to say, rhetoric is insufficient;
employees expect and disregard messages that smack of pos-
turing rather than legitimate organizational belief. Further-
more, legalistic emphasis on routine and formalism runs the
risk of both marginalization and self-deception. Formal sys-
tems can often be circumvented by clever forms of fraud, yet
their very presence, and the impression of normalcy they gen-
erate, can serve to reduce vigilance rather than heighten it."0
A related lesson for the lawyer is to seek a system that
helps to overcome the natural tendency of high-level managers
to overtrust each other and key employees. Partly, this in-
volves placing the task of coordinating compliance responsibili-
ty in the hands of high-level nonline managers. Line managers
are not only subject to conflicts of interest (the orthodox state-
ment of the problem), but also have so many other responsi-
bilities that the pressure to think heuristically with respect to
all but the most salient problems of the moment becomes over-
whelming. But the line managers have the informational ad-
vantage; they cannot be excluded from responsibility, or even
be allowed to perceive a sense of diffusion of responsibility that
permits them to rationalize their own inaction."'
129 Much of the study of illegal behavior in securities firms has emphasized the
degree to which a culture of "macho" competitiveness, of the ability to "invent the
rules" as the industry evolves-while probably intended at the top as limited to
legal activity-easily becomes a rationalization for the illegal. See SMITH & WAL-
TER, supra note 109; Reichman, supra note 118. In addition, there is evidence that
simple emphasis on short-term performance in compensation and promotion policies
creates an environment conducive to illegality. While one reason for this--the
economic pressure-is self-evident, there is also reason to believe that such policies
offer an employee the ability to rationalize the misconduct.
130 See HAROLD L. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND
POLICY IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 91-92 (1967); ROBERT P. GANDOSSY, BAD
BUSINESS: THE OPM SCANDAL AND THE SEDUCTION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT 211-12
(1985).
131 Or which creates multiple layers of authority that hinders efficient action.
See Ron Chernow, A House Divided, WALL ST. J., March 3, 1995, at A10;
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The lawyer's challenge, therefore, closely resembles that of
the securities lawyer in fashioning disclosure. The organiza-
tional client may be biased, albeit generally in good faith, to-
ward resistance to threatening information about managerial
integrity. But the legal or compliance department cannot act
unilaterally and must enlist willing cooperation by line person-
nel. As much as anything, compliance lawyers must be
nonadversarial and nonauthoritarian-two things for which
most attorneys are not noted-to overcome the cognitive resis-
tance. As we have seen, trust within an organization is gener-
ally adaptive. An environment of suspicion generated by com-
pliance personnel is likely not only to disrupt in an inefficient
way the trust-based operation of the business but result in
treatment of the compliance function as an out-group threat, to
be resisted and circumvented as inconsistent with group soli-
darity and the primary mission of the business as understood
by line personnel. This is especially likely if the compliance
managers operate in an overtly bureaucratic fashion, empha-
sizing an excess of formal routine over which they can assume
exclusive control, thereby making a greater claim to power and
resources.
C. Lawyers as Directors
A topic of persistent interest in the legal profession has
been whether lawyers should serve as directors of the
client."3 2 Various reasons have been given for and against
this practice; one of the common arguments against it is that it
compromises the lawyer's independent judgment.s Rarely,
however, is there anything more than a conclusory statement
of this risk-no rigorous articulation of how and why this com-
promised independence may occur. This reduces the persuasive
Markham, supra note 45, at 150 n.103.
' For a good recent overview, see Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer.Director: An
Oxymoron2, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 413 (1996).
See, eg, Robert H. Mundheim, Should Code of Professional Responsibility
Forbid Lawyers to Serve on Boards of Corporations For Which They Act as Coun-
sell 33 Bus. LAW 1507 (1978); James H. Cheek, HI & Howard H. Lamar, IlI,
Lawyers as Directors of Clients: Conflicts of Interest, Potential Liability and Other
Pitfalls (PLI Corp. L. Series B4-6940, 1990). Obviously, as Cheek and Lamar point
out, there are other reasons besides concern about objectivity--eg., liability, con-
flict disqualification-to worry about the practice.
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force of the aspirational objection, leading individual lawyers
to conclude that this must be someone else's problem: that they
are sufficiently strong in character and intellect to resist any
discernable pressures toward compromised judgment.
The discussion in Parts I and II should make clear what
the problem is. First, service on the board causes a member to
make a set of commitments: selection of key executives, ap-
proval of transactions and programs, and so forth. Inevitably,
such commitments create an unconscious bias toward their jus-
tification, which in turn can interfere with an objective analy-
sis of their legal status, whether for purposes of disclosure or
otherwise. The lawyer-director who votes to recommend a re-
capitalization program to the shareholders, for instance, will
usually be resistant to an objective assessment of its risks.
Just as important, the group solidarity influences dis-
cussed earlier can also be biasing. The more the lawyer-direc-
tor is socialized into the management group, the more value
she will place on protecting it and embracing its belief system.
This becomes especially problematic to the extent that there is
a potential conflict of interest between the board members and
the entity itself, as in a control shift situation. Even if indepen-
dent counsel is retained, the lawyer-director will probably have
a disproportionate influence on that lawyer's perceptions.
This is not to say that a per se rule against service on
client boards is necessary. Board membership only intensifies
the pull toward cognitive dependence, a pull that is strong
even without service.1" Presumably, a lawyer capable of cog-
nitive independence as a matter of professional responsibility
could serve ably, perhaps better than many other outside direc-
tors. The message here, however, is that the pressures are
strong, subtle and largely unconscious. A belief that they can
easily be resisted is more likely to reflect hubris and self-serv-
ing inference than candid self-reflection.
" See Symposium, Should Counsel Also Serve on the Board?, 33 BUs. LAW.
1511, 1514 (1974) (remarks of Kenneth J. Bialkin).
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CONCLUSION
In academic and professional discourse, lawyers tend to be
highly rationalist in their assessments of human and organiza-
tional behavior. This is a wonderful "working myth" that al-
lows us, among other things, to see law as more influential ex
ante than it really is. But as most of us confront real life and
real clients, we observe something else. Ego, rationalization,
denial, defensiveness, stress and other predictable imperfec-
tions skew the thinking of people who, dispositionally, are
perfectly respectable individuals. Organizations exhibit the
same tendencies collectively, behaving bureaucratically rather
than as paragons of rationality. In this light, many of the dis-
position-oriented teachings of professional responsibility seem
overly simplistic and unhelpful. Among other things, a dose of
behavioral realism will lead to insights that lawyers will actu-
ally find useful as they work in a world where knowledge is
fuzzy and changeable, and gray areas dominate the black and
white.
One of the important teachings of social psychology is that
people attribute far more coherence and after-the-fact causality
to the world than is apt. This manifests itself in the overesti-
mation of character in the course of events, at the expense of
situation and chance. We try hard to explain good outcomes in
terms of the influence of good people, and bad results in terms
of bad actors. This leads to several forms of belief, one of which
is that once we decide that good people are involved in the
situation, we can relax and trust their judgment.
As a heuristic, this is not a bad bet. But it creates an over-
confidence that, on rare occasion, leads to large errors. Most
dispassionate retrospective studies of bad events are much
muddier than we might like. The worst business disasters
often arise from a sequence of bad judgments by good people
who never sense the impending harm-decisions running from
Ford's Pinto problems through NASA's Challenger and Hubble
telescope fiascos have been so described in the management
literature.' There is a frustrating banality to the disaster.
' Barry A. Stein & Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Why Good People Do Bad Things:
A Retrospective on the Hubble Fiasco, 7 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 58 (1993). For a com-
prehensive view of the Challenger matter from a variety of conceptual aframe,"
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Because of their roles in risk disclosure and other forms of
counselling where risk assessment is crucial, good lawyers
must try to foresee the kinds of cognitive and organizational
pressures that bias managerial perception and decision-mak-
ing. They should be prepared to shift to a more vigilant mode
when conditions are right for distortion-even though the
company's managers may not particularly want to hear the
message. After all, the lawyer's client is the entity, not the
managers, and the entity is highly dependent on the law-
yer. 3 6 Deference to the judgment of the board of directors or
its agents is appropriate in the normal course of events, but is
no excuse for apathy if the lawyer takes his professional re-
sponsibility seriously and believes that predictable biases have
compromised their judgment.
Facility at observing others, however, cannot come without
critical self-reflection. Most lawyers have a healthy dose of self-
esteem that leads to a host of egocentric attributions. We think
of ourselves as exceptional judges of character, of unimpeach-
able integrity, reasonable and balanced, strong in the face of
pressure. These, too, are wonderfully adaptive myths.'37 But
we cannot learn to assess events and the behavior of others
accurately if we are blinded to the pressures-cognitive and so-
cial-that can compromise our'judgment and inferences, pres-
sures that are intense and unavoidable in the highly abstract
and subjective world of the corporation. As much as we might
want to preserve our own illusion of control, we shouldn't un-
derestimate these pressures. In this sense, the journey toward
cognitive independence for a lawyer best begins with her-and
her profession's-own humility.
see BOVENS & T'HART, supra note 1, at 108-16.
1 See Painter, supra note 20.
13 Research shows that people persist in underestimating the likelihood that
their own cognitions are biased even when those biases are amply explained to
them. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 117, 125-26 (1994). On self-serving inference and lawyers' professional re-
sponsibility, see Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 665, 685-86 (1994); Jonathan R. Macey, Civic Education and Interest Group
Formation in the American Law School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1937, 1942-45 (1993).
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